Introduction
This article builds on linguistic anthropological investigations of processes of meaning-making conducted over the last three decades that have hinted at, but have yet to fully describe, the degree to which members of the speech communities they study rely on multiple, complex and sometimes competing interpretive practices and ideologies. Such practices and ideologies, it is here argued, emerge in certain interactional contexts as the multiple calculi of meaning, worked up in the (sometimes explicit) contestation over the significance of particular acts and events.
Specifically, it is claimed that because linguistic anthropologists engaged in this research have focused their work on an important refutation of John Searle's version of Speech Act Theory, and/or challenge the centrality and universality claimed for speaker intentions as the source of communicative meaning, they favored meaning-making practices where non-intentionalist theories of interpretation seemed more appropriate. Thus while this research has revealed the variety of interpretive practices that exist across speech communities around the world, what has never been fully explored from a linguistic anthropological perspective is the possibility that multiple, complex, and even competing calculi of meaning may operate within a single speech community, nor inquiry made into the communicative contexts in which these multiple meanings are made explicit.
This article is an endeavor to take up those hints and allusions and develop them further. Thus I show that one context in which such multiplicity is often constituted is that of social dispute and conflict, where discourses of argumentation reveal how members of a single community proffer competing interpretations of troubling acts and events (speech or otherwise) by recourse to distinct and sometimes competing practices and ideologies for calculating 1 what is significant about them. Building on the insights of J.L. Austin's treatment of speech act infelicities (1962/1975) , and on legal anthropology's 'trouble-case' methodology, (Llewellyn and Hoebel, 1941) , I show how competing meaning-making practices emerge in the dispute contexts of one speech community -specifically, in the talk between parties to probate disputes before the tribal courts of the Hopi Indian Tribe. Where these disputes are constituted in and through complex notions of intentionality and social normativity that ground both the Hopi discourses of custom and tradition and the Anglo-American juridical norms that inform contemporary Hopi tribal jurisprudence, I suggest that conflict talk among the courtroom interlocutors turns on multiple and competing calculations of meaning that foreground different aspects of the intentions, conventions, and consequences surrounding the disputed property claims.
Theories of meaning in speech act theory and the critiques from linguistic anthropology

SPEECH ACT THEORY AS 'INSPIRATION' AND 'BUTT' OF LINGUISTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY
In the early 1970s numerous linguistic anthropologists began embarking on parallel inquiries into theories of meaning that would, over the next three decades, become one of the guiding themes of their subdiscipline (DuBois, 1993; Duranti, 1984 Duranti, , 1988 Duranti, , 1993a Duranti, , 1993b Keenan [Ochs], 1974; Kuipers, 1990; Mitchell-Kernan, 1972; Morgan, 1991; Ochs, 1982 Ochs, , 1984 Ochs, , 1988 Rosaldo, 1982) In large measure, this scholarship emerged both in the spirit of, and with the aim of refuting, the principles of Speech Act Theory proffered by John Searle (1969) and claims to the universality of intention-driven models of meaning-making. 2 Indeed as Rosaldo (1982) writes in introducing her influential article, 'Speech Act Theory is at once my inspiration and my butt '. (p. 198 ). Rosaldo and other linguistic anthropologists shared with Searle -and Austin (1962 and Grice (1957 Grice ( , 1968 Grice ( , 1969 before him -in the recogni-tion of a need for understanding linguistic phenomena in ways that move beyond the semantico-referentialist models of earlier language philosophy and move instead toward interpretations that attend to the complex contexts that both inform and are informed by instances of language-in-use.
What both these ordinary language philosophers and these anthropologists recognized was the failure of grammatical and logical models of semantic meaning to account for the complexities recognizable in the meaning of language as communication. For the philosophers, this meant recognizing that many utterances -such as brides and grooms uttering 'I do' at the altar, or one friend saying 'I bet you a buck it rains' to another -bear a communicative value tied more to the actions performed by their expression than as truthful representations of a pre-existing reality.
By devising a model of language that accounted for a fuller panoply of uses of language in everyday life, Searle and Austin (particularly) incorporated, but moved beyond, notions of linguistic meaning as some context-free reference or denotation. For them, grasping only this level of locutionary meaning would never be sufficient to understand the total pragmatic fact of that utterance. Instead all acts of speech have a force in and an effect on the world that are not epiphenomenal to their fundamental communicative significance. Consequently, their model of the speech act revealed how interpretation of an utterance turned not only on semantics, but equally on the detailed interplay of social convention, speaker intention, and audience reception and consequence that informed the utterance as a social act.
A split would emerge, however, between Searle and Austin's versions of Speech Act Theory when Searle would argue that his model could universally account for complexities of communicative meaning by recourse primarily to notions of speaker intentionality. For Searle, what makes a particular utterance communicable, and communicable of its particular meaning and illocutionary force is most centrally the intentions with which it is produced (Searle, 1983) . Conventions and consequences associated with the context and social force of the speech act are only secondarily related to its significance. Thus he states, 'The speech act will be satisfied if and only if the expressed psychological state is satisfied, and the conditions of satisfaction of speech act and expressed psychological state are identical' (Searle, 1983: 27) . Indeed he would contend that the question of meaning is precisely the question of how intention is attributed to brute physical phenomena (phonemes, hand signals, marks on paper, etc.) making them vessels for signification and communication. Searle (1983) writes, 'Meaning exists only where there is a distinction between Intentional content and the form of its externalization, and to ask for the meaning is to ask for an Intentional content that goes with the form of externalization '. (p. 28) .
It is on the grounds of Searle's fronting of intentionality in speech act significance, and the degree to which he posits this as a universal quality of meaning-making everywhere, that linguistic anthropologists would themselves draw a line in analytic sands that they would claim their ethnographic data would not allow them to cross. Marshalling evidence from the details of discourse from such disparate speech communities as those of the Ilongot, African Americans, Kaluli, and Samoans, among others, these anthropologists argue for the existence, and even the prevalence of meaning-making practices and ideologies that take more measure of social consequence and convention than intentions when evaluating the significance of talk. Thus, several scholars claimed, Searle's model of an intention-driven meaning proves little more than an agglomeration of intuitions informed by European and Euro-American folk theories of atomistic, individuated selves, as the sole bearers of 'meaning-making' capacities, rather than a valid description of the structures and practices of interpretation as they emerge in the details of actual communicative events.
THE LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUES Rosaldo's (1982) analysis of speech acts and theories of meaning among the Ilongot is perhaps one of the better-known challenges to Searle's work. In it Rosaldo claims that Searle's emphasis on speakers intentions as the central feature of meaning-making universally is the product of his reliance on western folk models of private selves of an individualistic personhood. Her evidence of this 'folksiness' rests in Searle's insistence on using promising as the paradigmatic speech act form. '[B]y focusing on the promise', Rosaldo writes, ' [Searle] falls victim to the folk views that locate social meaning first in private persons -and slight the sense of situational constraint [ . . .]' (Rosaldo, 1982: 212) .
Rosaldo backs her challenge by exploring various Ilongot interactionsincluding command interactions (Tuydek) among kin in domestic contexts and public verbal duels among male age-mates -where she claims the measure of the meaning of speech acts were made by interlocutors more in light of the social relations constituted by them than in any orientation to speaker's intentions. 'Thus', she explains 'kin are . . . the people who articulate their relations in mundane services and commands' (Rosaldo, 1982: 210) and assertions in verbal duels are less significant as truth claims regarding headhunting accusations than as the media for participants to choose sides via negotiations over 'who spoke out and claimed the privilege to reveal or hide a public secret ' (p. 214) .
It is by way of observations such as these that Rosaldo comes to state her most radical claim. That is, that Ilongot entirely lack the sense of intentional self as conceptualized in the 'West', one 'continuous through time, a self whose actions can be judged in terms of sincerity, integrity, and commitment actually involved in his or her bygone pronouncements' (Rosaldo, 1982: 218) . And it is by virtue of this fundamental metaphysical difference, she contends, that Searle's intentionality driven theory of meaning must ultimately fail as an account of any universal model of human interpretive practices. Thus she concludes that her Ilongot examples '. . . help display the problems that inhere in all attempts to construe action in universal and subjective terms, without regard for how societies and cultures shape our selves, our motives, and our activities (Rosaldo, 1982: 228) .
Although other linguistic anthropologists critiquing Searle seem more reluctant than Rosaldo to posit a lack of unified selfhood in the metaphysics of the communities they study, they nonetheless share in her efforts to re-situate his theory of meaning, and its emphasis on intentionality, within the ideological contexts of western notions of person, morality and society. Thus both Duranti (1984 Duranti ( , 1988 Duranti ( , 1993a Duranti ( , 1993b and Ochs (1982 Ochs ( , 1984 Ochs ( , 1988 find that the Samoan peoples they worked with, 'typically see talk and interpretation as activities for the assignment of responsibility rather than as exercises in reading "others minds"'. (Ochs, 1984: 332) . Duranti discovers this in his examination of the Samoan juridicopolitical speech event called the fono, where orators, speaking on behalf of village chiefs to announce future activities and events, are held responsible and chastised for misleading others if later the announced events do not come to pass. In the calculation of the meaning and significance of such speech acts, fono participants 'start from the consequences, rather than the premises, of ones words,' (Duranti, 1993a: 24) and orient more toward the public identities and the social relations that inhere between an orator and his referent and audience.
Ochs (1984) argues for a similar dispreference for inquiries into speaker's intentions in her examination of adult-child interaction, and the general lack among care-giving adults of the use of 'expressed guesses' as a strategy for requesting clarification of their young interlocutors' utterances. Where explicit guessing appears 'tied to the pursuit of speaker's intention', insofar as it presumes a capacity among guessers to search the internal states of their interlocutors for what they 'might' or 'must' have intended to mean, Ochs' observation of Samoan caregiver's preference for 'minimal grasp' forms of clarification request -whereby the requester avoids such queries by either asking the child to repeat the utterance or they themselves display their incomplete reception by repeating only a portion of the child's utterance (Ochs, 1984) -suggests, she claims, a minimized role that intentions play in Samoan calculations of utterance meaning in such contexts. It is in light of analysis of the details of these and other Samoan interactions, that both Ochs and Duranti agree that, contra Searle, 'For Samoans, meaning is seen as the product of an interaction (words included) and not necessarily as something that is contained in someone's mind' (Duranti, 1993a: 41) .
Similarly, DuBois (1993) in his reconsideration of ethnographic data of divination practices from various African communities (Bascom, 1969 (Bascom, , 1980 Bohannon, 1975; Evans-Pritchard, 1937; Mendonsa, 1982) , examines the extent to which the social functionality of all of these practices turn on the capacity for social actors engaged in them to produce 'intentionless meanings' (DuBois, 1993) . Thus when Azande turn to the benge poison oracle for assistance in making important but difficult life decisions, the opposing propositions that are posed (e.g. that a marriage should go forward or not) are deemed confirmed by the resultant death or continued life of a fowl forced to ingest the poison. But the confirmation that arrives is not one that comes backed by intentions -the oracle is not understood as having a mind or personality that wills or means to have the certain message delivered. 'It is a thing ' (Evans-Pritchard, 1937: 320) , whose messages, DuBois suggests, are more akin to the kinds of readings of natural phenomena and their patterns that are made via tools like Geiger counters or stethoscopes. Indeed, it is the very aleatory character of these practices, and the degree to which they simultaneously are 'intention-suppressing' but 'within an interpretive matrix which allows attribution of significance . . . constituted as authoritative but apersonal validations of instantiated meanings' (DuBois, 1993: 65) that makes them perfect devices for making tough human choiceschoices that social actors would rather not bear a responsibility for having intended. As such, DuBois claims, such divination practices are exemplary of the kind of meaning-making practices that would be critically misunderstood in the framework of a Searlean, intention-driven model of Speech Act theory.
As efforts designed primarily to counter Searle's model, these studies offered compelling evidence that much meaning-making around the world gets done through theories and practices of interpretation that have little or nothing to do with searching out the intentions of interlocutors. As such they proved once again the important corrective that anthropological inquiry and ethnographic data can play in checking the claims to human universality made by scholars who do not reckon with the diversity of structure, practice and belief that constitute human culture and society, including their interpretive practices.
But while these studies stand for the need to appreciate the multiplicity and complexity of human meaning-making activity across different speech communities, they only hint at the possibility of such multiplicity within speech communities. Indeed, in light of their orientation as refutations to Searle's claims, in large measure these studies focused only on those discourses and speech contexts that provided evidence of the starkest contrast of interpretive practices to the Searlean speech act model. Importantly, some of these scholars readily recognized this analytic bias to their work, and announce the possibility of multiple, complex and even contradictory meaning-making practices operating in the speech communities they studied. Thus Duranti (1993a) is emphatic in expressing that:
. . . [M] y main goal in this paper is not to argue that for Samoans the recognition of the speaker's intentions is not a legitimate route to understanding. I imagine that it could be demonstrated that there are contexts in which it is. My point is that it is not the only route and furthermore in some contexts the dispreferred one.
(p. 44) Indeed, he even suggests that concerns with speaker intentions are differentially distributed along the spectrum of Samoan social hierarchies, such that a speaker or actor of higher social rank, especially high chiefs, can even be said to "own", as it were, the meaning of his own words and expect others to comply with his own interpretation' in attributions not regularly made of the actions of lower ranked Samoans (Duranti, 1988: 29) . Yet this insight is never developed more completely.
Similarly Ochs is quick to dispel any dichotomy, like the one Rosaldo draws, in which personalist, intention-driven theories of meaning, characterize the West and antipersonalist sense-making prevails everywhere else (Ochs, 1984) . She writes, 'This distinction . . . is too simplistic [. . .] . The difference between societies lies in the contexts in which these two orientations prevail, the relative importance given to each of them, and the frequency with which these orientations mark social interaction' (Ochs, 1984: 336) . DuBois (1993) too is careful to point out that his analysis of the intentionless meaning production central to divination does not at all 'refute the role of intention in language use' and that, 'There may well be good reason to recognize at least some ways of speaking in some cultures that demand for their interpretation a reference to the intentions of speech actors. . . ' (p. 68) .
None of these scholars give full ear to the possibility of these other meaningmaking practices, nor to the possibility that a range of such practices, intention driven and not, might be worked up by members in explicit contestation or competition for calculating the significance of the speech events and activities they do describe. Even further, as we saw earlier, Rosaldo explicitly rejects the possibility that, in at least some speech contexts, intentions and intentionality might enter into the mix when Ilongot work at constructing the significance of actions and events with which they are engaged.
As a result, what has never been fully explored from a linguistic anthropological perspective, is the possibility that multiple, complex and perhaps even competing calculi of meaning may operate within a single speech community both within and across their contexts of interaction.
The possibility of multiplicity of meaning: Theoretical and ethnographic precedents
J.L. AUSTIN'S ANALYSIS OF INDETERMINACY IN SPEECH ACT INFELICITY
The possibility of a multiplicity of interpretive practices does have its theoretical precedents in Speech Act Theory, albeit in Austin's (1962 Austin's ( /1975 formulation more than Searle's (1969 Searle's ( , 1983 . It is most clearly revealed in Austin's notion of the felicity conditions upon which the success of any speech act can be evaluated. As alluded to earlier, Austin's model provides that for a speech act to be successful, it requires not only proper intentions, but also the accomplishment of certain accepted conventional procedures, and its appreciation by interlocutors in light of its actual consequences and effects. A speech act will be 'unhappy' (unsuccessful) in conveying a certain force if any of these conditions -intentions, conventions, or consequences -are violated or unfulfilled.
But by recognizing the role of these conditions in the mix of determining utterance significance, Austin admittedly opened the door to a degree of indeterminacy in interpretation. He reveals this indeterminacy when he discusses how it is often easier to identify a particular speech act as unsuccessful than to pinpoint why it is unsuccessful. He offers an example of the naming of a ship, asking what if some person in mid-twentieth century England, not chosen to name a ship, merely walked up to it, smashed the bottle dangling from it, and proclaimed 'I name this shape the Mr. Stalin'. He explains (in a now quaintly historical way), that 'We can all agree (1) that the ship was not thereby named; (2) that it is an infernal shame'. (Austin, 1962 (Austin, /1975 . But beyond this general agreement that the act was infelicitous, there need be little consensus as to what actually did happen. 'One could say that I "went through a form of " naming the vessel but that my "action" was "void" or "without effect" because I was not a proper person', Austin continues, 'but one could also and alternatively say that, where there is not even a pretence of capacity or colourable claim to it, then there is no accepted conventional procedure; it is a mockery, like marriage with a monkey ' (1962/1975: 23-24) .
This indeterminacy arises, Austin explains, because in fact, cases of infelicity are not 'mutually exclusive', insofar as 'we can go wrong in two ways at once (we can insincerely promise a donkey to give it a carrot)' and 'more importantly', that 'ways of going wrong "shade into another" and "overlap" and the decisions between them is "arbitrary" in various ways'. (Austin, 1962 (Austin, /1975 .
Where Austin's model of the speech act thus admits of the fundamental inability to identify the particular felicity conditions not met in any given instance of failed illocution, is it possible that the model also suggests a fundamental multiplicity in calculating the interpretation of any speech act, even successful ones? And that if we attempted to interrogate such a successful act, and plumb the depths of its social and cognitive circumstances, might we actually not find any singularly identifiable set of intentions, conventions, and consequences that could uncontroversially be called the 'source' of its meaning? His model provides for the possibility that all speech acts are susceptible to multiple and sometimes competing theories of interpretation that differentially foreground some elements of the conventions, intentions, and conditions that make them meaningful. And, in much the same way that Wittgenstein contemplated in his notion 'language games', where such indeterminacy among these multiple theories remains elided in some contexts of everyday speech, in others -namely interactions of explicit contestation such as those of conflict talk -the multiplicity and even intractability among these different theories becomes a strategic resource actively constructed by interlocutors striving to accrue to themselves contested material and symbolic resources that rest at the heart of the conflict.
GOLDMAN'S ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE NOTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN CONFLICT TALK
Significantly, the possibility of such multiplicity of meaning-making has also been given ethnographic support in a study of legal language and interaction among the Huli of Papua New Guinea (Goldman, 1993) . As part of his broader challenge to the mischaracterization in legal anthropology of many nonWestern societies as lacking a concept of accidental, non-intentional injury (what he calls 'the myth' of Absolute Liability), Goldman argues that it is within 72 Discourse & Society 17(1) the context of dispute discourses that the multiple theories for interpreting events within a single speech community can be made explicit in ways not discernable in other speech contexts (Goldman, 1993) . Significantly, he pursues this argument in part by critiquing Ochs' work regarding theories of interpretation in Samoa.
Specifically, Goldman suggests that what Ochs claims to be the central Samoan notion of responsibility attribution -amio, a notion she defines as 'natural behavior' bereft of any semantic loading of thought or intentionalityis actually far more equivocal and indeterminate. He cites Shore's (1981) description of amio as 'motivations' to suggest that it 'spans the meaning of individual will and motivation, as well as social consciousness and sociality' (Goldman, 1993: 286) .
But Goldman goes further than merely muddying the notoriously murky waters of lexical translation, suggesting that it is just this kind of indeterminacy, and the competing efforts to impose one attribution of meaning and responsibility over another, that often lies at the heart of dispute interactions. In so doing he builds on one of the founding theoretical and methodological premises of the legal anthropological subfield, what Llwelleyn and Hoebel (1941) first dubbed the 'trouble-case' method. At its base, they claimed that, '. . . if there be a portion of a society's life in which tensions of the culture come to an expression, in which the play of variant urges can be felt and seen . . . that portion of the life will concentrate in the case of trouble or disturbance ' (Llwelleyn and Hoebel, 1941: 29) .
Following this perspective, Goldman suggests that the possibility of multiple attributions of responsibility, and the competing theories of interpretation that underlie them, are often best uncovered in the interactional contexts of 'perspectival conflict' (Goldman, 1993) . Thus he reveals how, in the discourses of a Huli dispute over the immolation of a woman, and accusations of murder that arose there, there persists an 'alchemy of accident' (p. 273) that resides in a host of low-level pragmatic details 3 that emerge despite a more overt ideology of absolute liability and an avoidance of inquiry into human intentions in responsibility attribution talk. Goldman suggests that what is key to understanding interpretation and meaning-making here is the pragmatic context of conflict and dispute within which the talk emerges. 'The context provides these meaning' (Goldman, 1993: 158) and 'perspectival conflict is of the essence here . . . the viability of accident interpretation has always to be established and tested within the ambit of motivational enquires' (p. 273).
Goldman's complete argument is too involved to reproduce here in its entirety, but by way of example, we can look at his exploration of the repeat occurrence in one case transcript of what he calls 'morality adverbs' (insofar as they bear on the attribution of jural responsibility) and their co-occurrence restrictions with certain transitive verbs. Goldman (1993: 273) recognizes that Huli entirely lacks purposive adverbials whose semantic loading might equate with English 'deliberately', 'willfully', or 'intentionally'. But what was regularly revealed in the transcript of the immolation dispute was the repeated use by one of the disputants (and the mediator) of adverbials of inadvertence (taba puwa) and accident (kogobo, mememe). Of particular significance for Goldman's argument are the co-occurrence restrictions that militate against these adverbial phrases being felicitously used with certain transitive verb forms.
One such form, Goldman discovers, is the Huli verb 'burn' -da in the intransitive, dela in the transitive. Goldman explains that dela is actually a construction of the da verb stem, combined with -la, a morpheme which always 'intimates intentional, deliberate action which involved both aforethought and decision . . .' (Goldman, 1993: 150) . Beyond merely the presumption of agency, then, the causitive/transitive form dela implies an act of burning that is always deliberate. Consequently, accidentality adverbials like mememe cannot regularly co-occur with dela, insofar as saying in Huli, 'She accidentally burnt the house' would be awkward in the same way as saying 'She accidentally built the house' is strange in English. Thus Goldman explains, For verbs like dela (causative/transitive 'burn'), to set alight is just to set alight intentionally, and it always presumes a volitional human agent in control [. . .] . In other instances, accidentality adverbs express a rebuttal of those normal conditions of presumption; but this is not an inference that can be made simpliciter from the absence of any 'positive' [purposive adverbial] around to wear the trousers. (Goldman, 1993 : 118, quoting Austin, 1956 Indeed, notions of intentionality and accidentality emerge in such inexplicit ways in these disputes through such co-occurrence restrictions and other pragmatic phenomena (including usage patterns of contrafactuals, ergative case-markings, and reflexive pronouns), Goldman contends, that there is 'nothing inconsistent about widespread observations of [. . .] reluctance to speculate on "mind"' among the Huli (as well, he implies, among Samoans too), and a 'categorical assertion that "intentions" are axiomatic to [a people's] jurisprudential ratiocination and discourse' (Goldman, 1993) . A valuable insight is thus suggested by Goldman's work. And that is, that with regard to analyses of the role that evaluations of intentions, consequences and conventions play in the calculation of responsibility in a given society, certain sociolinguistic phenomena and events may offer insights not available or relevant in others. While Ochs may have admirably captured the details of responsibility talk in adult-child interaction, and accurately described the lack of orientation toward intentions in such contexts, we cannot presume that other Samoan speech events (where determining responsibility is an explicit goal of the activity there) operate in precisely the same way.
And though it may often be the case that considerable parallels -and even mutual influences -exist across such intrasocietal communicative events, as Duranti (1993a) has in fact shown in his comparisons of Ochs' data and his own analyses of fono speech, 4 I do not think such parallels should be presumed for all societies. Calculations of responsibility and meaning in speech events where such are the public, institutional goal of the interaction thus may often be 74 Discourse & Society 17(1) informed by a very different set of ideologies and conventions affecting those calculations in ways not observable in interactions where such meaning-making practices are part of 'what speakers are up to', though not in any official or explicit way. 5 I suggest that the calculation of the meaningfulness of speech acts and events may not involve a uniform calculus across a given speech community or society, but rather social actors may orient to notions of intention, convention, and consequence in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways, depending on the social context within which such calculation occurs. In this sense one might more correctly speak not of the notion of responsibility, but of responsibilities, within a single social group, and likewise, of the related notions of intentionalities, conventionalities, and consequentialities. 6 To illustrate this with some concrete examples, I turn to the conflict talk that constitute property disputes before the tribal courts of the Hopi Indians. In so doing, I analyze how competing inquiries and representations of intentions, conventions and consequences constituted there sheds light on Hopi intentionality and the multiplicity of their meaning-making calculi.
The multiplicities of meaning in Hopi property disputes
THEORIES OF MEANING AMONG THE HOPI
Given the long history of anthropological research among the Hopi (see Laird, 1977; Whiteley, 1998 for good reviews and bibliographies), it should be little surprise that Hopi notions of self and intentionality have received their share of scholarly attention as well (see Brandt, 1954; Thompson, 1950; Whiteley, 1988 Whiteley, , 1998 Whorf, 1956 ). As most recently described by Whiteley, the Hopi notion of 'Tunatya', "intending," "intention," is the central concept in Hopi philosophy of action' (Whiteley, 1998: 39) . It is the centrality of Tunatya, along with the notions of pasiwni, 'planning', and natwani, 'self-practice' (Whiteley, 1998 ) that leads Whiteley to claim that Hopi possess a 'triune principle of intentionalism', an ideational complex 'of what we might call 'self ' and 'mind' that is both fundamental to Hopi ontology and 'foregrounded in Hopi discourse' (Whiteley, 1998: 39) .
Whorf too describes the centrality of Tunatya (which he translates as 'hope or hoping') to Hopi metaphysics, when he writes:
Every language contains terms that come to crystallize in themselves the basic postulates of an unformulated philosophy, in which is couched the thought of a people [. . .] . Such a term in Hopi is the word most often translated "hope" -tunatya [. . .] . The verb tunatya contains in its idea of hope something of our words "thought," "desire," and "cause," . . . . it is the Hopi term for SUBJECTIVE. (Whorf, 1956: 61-62) Thus, Whiteley suggests, it is a recognition of Hopi tunatya and pasiwni, as they might be translated as 'self-determination', that explains why, in Hopi origin narratives the demigod Maasaw refuses to lead them, noting 'that they could not be led since they . . . already had their own intentions' (Whiteley, 1998: 40) . It is also by virtue of this principle that Hopi explain the significance of ceremonial clowning. In certain public dances of Katsinam, Hopi ancestor spirits, men enacting the roles of sacred clowns (tsukut) engage in a morality play by which they ape various sorts of immoral acts, both entertaining and instructing/shaming their Hopi audiences about how and how not to behave. As the play unfolds, and the clowns' behavior gets worse and worse, the tsukumongwi (clown chief) is seen engaging with Mongwu (Owl Katsina) in plans to punish the tsukut and start a new life. In this manner, clowns are said to represent the efforts and need for humans to 'plan out life -again foregrounding conscious engagement in social action'. (Whiteley, 1998: 40) . Finally, natwani, in perhaps a more empirical sense, may also refer to crops, children, or other fruits of labor, highlighting their significance as 'worldly reflections of ones' self-practice and conduct' (Whiteley, 1998: 41) .
By providing this description, Whiteley, like Goldman, is not out to merely disprove shopworn models of western versus non-western notions of mind and self, where intentionality and inner states seem the sole purview of European and Euro-American thinking, and non-intentionalist conceptions characterize the rest. Clearly, his analysis does this. But he also more fundamentally challenges the very possibility of such an easy dichotomy, and in the process throws doubt on the idea that there always exists a clear line dividing intentions from conventions and consequences.
For Whiteley is careful to claim that Hopi notions of intentionality are not isomorphic with the concepts of self of western secular humanism because these notions are situated within a metaphysics of action that also includes 'supernatural agencies, cosmic forces, and fateful processes as well as goal oriented human pursuits' (Whiteley, 1998: 42) . Hopi concepts of social structure and convention are themselves 'agential, ripe with intentional force, and events/eventings are the products of originary universal intendings.' (Whiteley, 1998: 42) . From western humanist perspectives such a world, full with an intentionality that is the 'vital and causal aspect of the Cosmos' (Whorf, 1956: 62) , would seem to provide little space for the interpretation of actions as meaningful in light of the presence or absence of human desires. Where all is originally intended from the outset, would it ever seem necessary to calculate the meaning of events by recourse to inner states of social actors? Whence then do the notions of tunatya, pasiwni, and natwani, operate in Hopi metaphysical reflection?
Whiteley explains that at the same time, Hopi equally see human intentions as always able to directly impinge on such structures and conventions. As such, he contends that 'there are thus two intentionalisms in Hopi metaphysics and etiology' (Whiteley, 1998: 43) , what he calls the 'meta-intentionalism' of social structure and convention that grounds Hopi metaphysics, and another 'more direct sense of intentional action by conscious agents', that is more pragmatic in attributing individual motivations to actions (Whiteley, 1998: 43) . He offers an explanation for their interrelationship:
Individual intentions, then, while the mark of conscious, agential selves, are ultimately not the private properties of rational-mechanical individual organisms, but are more fragments of individuated consciousness broken off from a great chain of intentional being. But if all, at the level of essential metanarrative, was intended, the manifesting-manifested trajectory is not a lockstep matching of event to structure. These individuated fragments of consciousness, granted subjectivity and life, have free will -particularly in their capacity for moral action -to perform acts adherent to models of the social good, or, conversely, to depart from this to further selfish interests. (Whiteley, 1998: 43) There remains, however, something fundamentally ambiguous here, at least for this (western humanist?) reader. For while Whiteley demonstrates how, as operating against a background of universal intentionality, Hopi notions of the intending self are not the same as 'western' liberal notions of the fully intending self, he also attempts to reserve for Hopi the possibility that such selves are also understood as having free will. Indeed, the latter does seem like an accurate description, even by virtue of my own experience of the repeatedly observed willingness of Hopi people to assign such negative occurrences such as the lack of rain, or the onset of illness, to the insincere or anti-social intentions of particular individuals. But Hopis also seemed perfectly able to interpret events as thoroughly devoid of intent or planning -what Goldman (1993) would certainly call accident. Whiteley himself alludes to this when he describes how:
Often, with irony and cultural reflexivism, Hopis jokingly accuse each other (or me) of acting intentionally after an inadvertent or accidental occurrence. The awareness of an over-determining paradigm of intentionalist explanation such jokes reveal suggest a skepticism . . . and critical rationalism at work in everyday explanations too. (Whiteley, 1998: 40) Consequently, I would like to suggest that, while (at least) the two intentionalisms identified by Whiteley do in fact operate in Hopi metaphysics, they do not necessarily articulate in any fully systematic or non-conflicting way. Rather the two constitute independent and distinct metaphysical theories for explaining the significance of actions and events in the world that often, but not always, repose on each other. As such, the competing and conflicting grounds of these two theories may be hidden in an indeterminacy overlooked in the successful flow of most everyday Hopi interaction, but which in certain social contexts of conflict and dispute, can be strategically invoked by Hopi to perpetuate a quite stark juxtaposition of meanings and interpretations of actions and events.
Furthermore, I argue pace Goldman (1993) , and Llewellyn and Hoebel (1941) before him, that interaction in the Hopi legal arena is a unique site for observing the multiple calculi of Hopi meaning. As I shall reveal, this is in large partly due to the efforts of the court to strike a balance between the AngloAmerican style juridical norms and practices that constitute much contemporary Hopi tribal law with local notions of Hopi custom and tradition that judges have also been mandated to consider and rely upon in resolving disputes. I do not Richland: The multiple calculi of meaning 77 suggest that what emerges in Hopi courtroom interactions is a breakdown of meaning-making practices that neatly aligns intention-driven theories of interpretation with those enacting ' Anglo' style legal claims, and conversely those making claims in Hopi tradition drawing on convention and consequence to press their interpretations of disputed events. Instead, and in light of the two Hopi notions of intentionality and how they figure both in their construction of tradition (or navoti 'knowledge/teachings') and in the conceptualization of ' Anglo' style legal discourses, I argue that Hopi legal actors construct several conflicting meaning-making practices in the adversarial interactions of the courtroom that sometimes rely on intentions, sometimes conventions and consequences, and sometimes a combination of these interpretive components in rather vivid moments of strategic interpretive calculations (see Figure 1) Hopi Tribal Council was convened to provide for tribal leadership over such 'external' matters as trade and commerce relations with the U.S. and several states, and intervillage law enforcement. However, many of the internal matters of village life remained under the purview of village leadership (By-Laws and Constitution of the Hopi Tribe, 1936) .
In large measure, Ordinance 21 relies heavily on the procedures of AngloAmerican style adjudication when enumerating the operations of the Hopi Tribal Courts. Consequently, many of the basic processes and practices in the Hopi Tribal Court system appear very similar to the activities of many U.S. state and federal courts. Generally speaking, the Hopi tribal legal process is adversariallitigants submit written briefs and present oral arguments at trial before the court. In oral arguments, litigants have the opportunity to present evidence, take witness testimony, cross-examine their opponents' witnesses, and then provide closing arguments. Final decisions are made either by juries made up of members of the tribe, or by judges, and such decisions can be appealed to the Hopi Appellate Court upon the showing of some judicial error.
All Hopi legal proceedings are heard in one of two courtrooms adjacent to the Hopi police headquarters, situated on a plot of land leased to the Hopi tribe by one of the villages, eight miles west of Keams Canyon on the Hopi Indian Reservation. The various participants in those proceedings are also notably similar to the players in Anglo-American courts. To sit on the Hopi judiciary, non-Hopis must have law degrees, while members of the Hopi tribe must have some legal training, but need not have gone to law school. Litigants have the right to represent themselves or retain counsel. Counsel need not have a law degree, nor be members of the tribe. Owing to prohibitions of cost and location, counsel is extremely difficult for parties to retain, litigants regularly represent themselves or retain one of several lay advocates located in the area whose primary practice is representing clients in the Navajo, Hopi and other tribal courts in the area. Also present for most trial proceedings are a court clerk, a bailiff, and an audience composed of relatives of the parties, litigants waiting for their trials, and other court officials.
At the same time that the Hopi Tribal Court employs these Anglo-American style adversarial roles, rules and procedures, other tribal legislation and case law require the Court to give a preferential place to Hopi customs, traditions and culture. In Resolution H-12-76, the Hopi Tribal Council mandated that 'in deciding matters of both substance and procedure', the Tribal Court give more 'weight as precedent to the . . . customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi Tribe' than to U.S. state and federal law (see Resolution, Hopi Tribe, H-12-76). The Hopi Appellate Court has recently reiterated this rule, writing in Hopi Indian Credit Association v. Thomas (AP-001-84, 1996) , 'The customs, traditions and culture of the Hopi Tribe deserve great respect in tribal courts, for even as the Hopi Tribal Council has merged laws and regulations into a form familiar to American legal scholars, the essence of our Hopi law as practiced, remain distinctly Hopi' (AP-001-84, 1996: 4). A review of Hopi case file archives reveal that since 1980, 49 civil complaints concerning property were filed with the court. Property issues loom large in Hopi member's concerns about law and order in their village communities. This is reflected in the Hopi Constitution, which when originally drafted by the Bureau of Indian Affairs was designed in recognition of the degree to which Hopis in 1936 identified matters of property as an intensely local concern. Indeed, despite other major governmental reforms written into that Constitution, issues regarding probate and the assignment of village land were two of only four subject matter areas (along with family disputes and adoptions) reserved to the exclusive jurisdiction of what is generally referred to as the 'traditional' leadership of the nine separate Hopi villages (By-Laws and Constitution of the Hopi Tribe Article III, § 2 [1936] ). This reservation is still recognized today, and property disputes that come before the Hopi tribal court are heard there only because the village leaders responsible for addressing the matter have waived that original jurisdiction.
Thus the Hopis' concerns regarding property remain deep. The research from which this study emerges is part of a larger project initiated after Hopi village leaders from across the Hopi reservation met with Hopi court officers and identified disputes over property as their single greatest threat to the health and welfare of Hopi communities today. And a primary problem identified by tribal members regarding the resolution of these property conflicts is the difficulties they perceive in balancing property based claims on notions of Hopi culture and tradition with the Anglo-American style jurisprudence they see as characterizing contemporary Hopi tribal law.
Consequently, it is not surprising that discourses of culture and tradition are a frequent and recurrent feature of both the written texts and oral arguments proffered by litigants, witnesses, lawyers and judges in Hopi property disputes. A review of the 49 property cases on file with the Hopi court, reveals that 33 include recurrent statements by one or more legal actors regarding rights to the property at issue, or requests for how the dispute should be resolved, that invoke some aspect of Hopi custom and tradition. And of the 12 hearings held before the court since 1995 for which audio-recordings were available, in only one did parties not argue a matter of Hopi tradition or culture. 8 These figures mirror trends in other tribal courts across Indian Country in the United States. In a recent study of 359 published tribal court decisions from 1992 to 1998, of 56 80 Discourse & Society 17(1) different tribal jurisdictions, opinions concerning property disputes included references to tribal customs and traditions more often than opinions concerning any other subject matter area (Barsh, 1999) .
Qualitatively, the instances of traditional talk that emerge in Hopi courtroom interactions reveal a wide diversity of form, content, and distribution of speaking rights. Thus statements of tradition are expressed by Hopis and non-Hopis, and by lay-persons, advocates, and judges, in both English and Hopi utterances. Furthermore, in some instances, tradition is sometimes constituted through explicit reference, whereas in others, it is indexed through talk about clan relations and ceremonial and other social obligations (Figure 1) . These examples reveal the regularity with which notions of Hopi tradition are invoked within the adversarial participation frameworks of opening arguments, witness examination and other genres of Hopi tribal court discourse. Moreover they suggest the extent to which Hopi and non-Hopi interlocutors are able to Richland: The multiple calculi of meaning 81 construct these notions as articulating principles of proper behavior and social status -conventions, or the 'meta-intentionalism' of a manifesting social world, in Whiteley's terms -against which the significance and meaningfulness of the actions and events at issue in these disputes can be evaluated. In these instances, the legal actors appear to be constructing tradition in ways that, at least on the surface take no measure of the inner states of particular social actors involved in the event or action under dispute.
(1) Referencing and indexing Hopi tradition in property hearings
But in other moments within and across these disputes, concerns with the intentions of particular persons do seem to enter into the meaning-making calculations made through tradition based arguments. Thus consider the following exchange:
(2) The intentionality of tradition (22 March 1995) Notice in the construction of his question, the attorney employs a series of propositions at ll. 003-005 that attempt to frame the witness' knowledge and understanding of the traditional principles she is testifying to as based on her in-group status as Hopi and village member 'her entire life'. Using the proposition + tag question format in this way, the attorney works to constrain the witness toward the production of a response that indexes her claims to Hopi tradition as significant because of the social conventions of practice and belief that are known to all Hopi members of her village. But significantly, in ll. 009-014, the witness response ignores these constraints, instead formulating the truth-value of her claims as derived from the particular motivations, desires, and 'instructions' of her grandmother. In this light, tradition seems less the expression of conventional practices and values, and more the overt expression of the intentions of her esteemed elder. In another example the significance of Hopi tradition as the product of individual intentions is made even more explicit. The following statement was offered 82 Discourse & Society 17(1) by a man who claimed a home in dispute based on the grounds that his mother made an oral bequest to him before she died.
(2) Tradition as intentions (27 December 1997) How might we account for this apparent indeterminacy revealed in all these examples regarding the source of meaningfulness, and hence the meaningmaking that gets accomplished, through Hopi courtroom discourses concerning tradition? Why is it the case that the interpretive practices that are constituted through these tradition discourses sometimes index issues of social convention and consequence, and other times seem to turn on the speaker's concern with intentions? I would suggest that the concept of tradition, when properly understood from a Hopi perspective, is a notion that can be invoked to capture both the content of highly valued knowledge, and the equally significant communicative contexts in which such knowledge is transferred, and as such blurs divisions between the intentions, conventions and consequences that operate as the sources of the meaningfulness of tradition discourses for Hopi speakers. Navoti, the lexical term regularly employed by Hopis to refer to tradition, is also regularly translated as 'teachings'. In its idealized form, navoti refers to, as Whiteley explains, 'valued knowledge' which 'concerns the ability to influence, create or transform events in the world' (Whiteley, 1998: 94) and which, in the idealized model of Hopi communicative practices, as with other Pueblos (Kroskrity, 1993; Ortiz, 1972) , is transferred in moments by esteemed individuals to neophytes in highly secretive ritual practices to which only initiated members are allowed access. Indeed, navoti is a nominalization of the verb navota, 'notice through the perceptions', which includes the reception of knowledge via listening and hearing. Studies of Hopi storytelling suggest that those genres that include information regarding the sacred histories of clan migration, and other sacred knowledge and the normative principles conveyed there, are distinguished by the repetitive use of the yaw quotative particle ('it is said'), a marker that 'traditionalizes' the story and its performance by indexing how the information Richland: The multiple calculi of meaning 83 being conveyed reports the talk related at some prior communicative moment (Kroskrity, 1993; Shaul, 2002; Wiget, 1987) .
Thus I contend the Hopi notion of navoti, and hence 'tradition', captures a reference not just to the content conveyed through such 'teachings', but also the esoteric and exclusive processes and practices of those conveyances as well. Hopi concepts of tradition in this way mirror other notions that Whorf (1956) describes as capturing the 'eventuating' or 'manifesting' character of Hopi conceptualizations of the world, insofar as they include:
equally and indistinguishably all that we call mental . . . or as the Hopi would prefer to say, in the heart, not only the heart of man, but . . . behind and within all the forms and appearances in nature . . . the essence and typical form of which is the striving of purposeful desire, intelligent in character toward manifestation.
(pp. 59-60)
Tradition is thus a notion that precisely straddles the dual intentionalisms described by Whiteley (1998) earlier, suggesting not just the insights regarding the manifesting, 'meta-intentionalism' of the world and its natural forces, but equally the intention filled moment in which that information is communicated. As such, I would contend that the notion of tradition as understood by these Hopi does not unambiguously refer only to social conventions as generalizable and decontextualized from the processes by which knowledge of such conventions were passed as 'instructions' from their elders. Indeed, it is precisely the fact that this information can be indexed as exclusively received through such moments of instruction, from their mothers, uncles, fathers. and others, that gives such information its traditional authority. Tradition from this perspective is thus a meaning-making practice through which Hopi legal actors can construct the significance of disputed events in light of both considerations of social convention and individual intentions, in ways that sometimes, but not always, repose on each other.
However, to properly reveal how this is the case in the context of Hopi property disputes, and hence capture the full spectrum of meaning-making multiplicity that emerges there -including the meaning-making that gets accomplished through Anglo-American legal notions -it is necessary to consider how such practices unfold in the adversarial interactions over the course of a single courtroom proceeding. To do that I turn to the details of a hearing that was held in the summer of 2000.
The multiplicities of meanings in a Hopi probate dispute
The hearing in question concerned a challenge raised by a woman (renamed 'Jean' here) to the appointment of an administrator of the purported will of her adopted mother ('Nellie'), who was recently deceased. Jean's opponent 'Dan', the man named in the will as the administrator, was also adopted as a child by the decedent. Under the terms of the will in question, both parties were bequeathed 84 Discourse & Society 17(1) one of three homes controlled by Nellie. The home that Dan was promised, and which he would presumptively distribute to himself if appointed administrator, is the house that Jean was already occupying.
Thus the main thrust of Jean's challenge to Dan's appointment as administrator of the will, and her challenge to the will itself, turns fundamentally on her desire to remain where she was living, rather than relocate. As we shall see, her claims, and Dan's counterclaims, are pursued through arguments that draw on several competing theories of meaning that attempt to discern the significance of the testamentary document sometimes by querying the intentional states behind its production, sometimes by evaluating the conventions of Hopi property inheritance, and sometimes by alluding to the consequences that will result if the testamentary document is followed or ignored.
Jean's house was one of only two homes in her village of a type that Hopis' call a 'clan' or 'ceremonial home' -a central feature of the corporate estate of Hopi's matrilineally reckoned clans (Eggan, 1950; Titiev, 1944; Whiteley, 1988) and an ideological locus of women's activity and authority in sustaining the clan and the village's ritual cycle. Significantly, Hopi consultants informed me that it is possible to articulate certain foundational 'principles' of Hopi traditional property inheritance, the most common of these being that the use and occupation of clan homes pass from mothers to daughters (clan membership itself being reckoned matrilineally) who assist with ceremonial participation and that men were never to be the recipients of clan homes. As it was regularly stated to me, 'Men may build homes, but they never get homes'.
By occupying the home where Kooyemsi ('Mudhead katsinas') come to announce the Niman ceremony ('Homedance' held in mid June), villagers generally recognized Jean as the one who bore the primary responsibility for ritually greeting them when they emerge from the kivas, as well as for opening the home to non-resident clan and non-clan visitors during the two days of the dance itself. It was thus controversial to many of Jean's fellow villagers when they heard that Nellie had apparently willed the home to her son Dan, an unmarried man, and furthermore not even a member of Nellie or Jean's clan (Jean was the daughter of a fellow clanswoman of Nellie's, Dan was her brother-in-law's son).
Less clear than the 'principle' of matrilineal inheritance of property, however, is the procedures by which Hopi recognize such transfers as successfully accomplished. Some consultants and research suggest a model consistent with the corporate holding of property, where female and male clan leaders would get together to decide who among a decedent's daughters was best deserving of the home. Others suggest nothing nearly so formal, noting that individuals seemed able to promise use rights to their property as they saw fit, with or without the presence of witnesses. Files on record with the Hopi Tribal Court reveal that since the 1940s, at least some Hopi committed their probate wishes to written documents and filed them with the Court of Indian Offenses.
In both form and substance, the content of these documents support the claims of my consultants who reported that Hopi wishing to prepare wills would do so by seeking the assistance of legal professionals either at the Court, in the Hopi legal aid offices, or from private practitioners in nearby off-reservation cities. Most often, these documents are prepared in English, typed on onion-skin or (later) white bond paper, and 'signed' by the testators and their witnesses with thumbprints. The text of these documents is usually perfunctory, starting with a paragraph employing the formulaic language of Anglo-American testamentary instruments (e.g. 'I hereby bequeath . . .' or 'I, Nellie Karl, give to my son . . .') and then enumerating the various parcels of property to be distributed, along with their intended recipient.
As such, these documents bear the markings of being prepared with the purpose of meeting the principles of Anglo-American probate law. Where the 'first principle' of that law is 'the freedom of testation' or 'the premise that an owner is entitled to dispose of his property as he pleases in death as in life' (Langbein, 1975: 491) these documents are prepared in anticipation of the fact that they will be invoked in probate hearings that turn on the determination of 'two broad issues of testamentary intent: did the decedent intend to make a will, and if so what are its terms' (Langbein, 1975: 491) . Given that the Hopi Tribe has no probate code of its own, it should come as little surprise that where these testamentary documents have been introduced in probate proceedings, Hopi judges have tended, at least initially, to evaluate them in light of these same principles.
As such, it may already be possible to discern the competing lines of discourse along which talk of conventions, consequences and intentions get worked up in this dispute, and who stands to gain by interpreting the will according to them. But as we shall see, as with our earlier examples of Hopi tradition discourse, here too there is no neat division between the two interpretive frames proposed by the Hopi interlocutors, as Jean, Dan and the judge all proffer multiple and diffuse rationale for interpreting the speech act, drawing on these very different theories less in the development of some logical, stepwise argument and rather more like producing a patchwork display of possible intentions, conventions, and consequences, that might envelop the testamentary instrument and give it the general significance they each propose it bears.
HOPI DISPUTE INTERACTION AND THE COMPETING THEORIES OF MEANING
On the day of the hearing, present in the tribal courtroom were Jean, her daughter Arlene (her co-complainant), Dan and his non-Hopi legal advocate, and several relatives of both parties and the decedent. Also present were the court clerk and bailiff, two Hopis from a different village than that of the parties. The judge presiding over the hearing is a Hopi woman from yet another village.
After opening the proceedings by acknowledging the audience, and giving the two parties an opportunity to state their claims, the judge states the principles that will guide her determination as to whether Dan should be named administrator of the estate, following the terms outlined in Nellie's will. And indeed these principles turn on whether the will is a valid expression of Nellie's testamentary intent. The judge says: Thus what Dan hears the judge asking him to describe is not a recitation of the events of 15 April 1999 -not just proof that Nellie intended what was written on that day -but rather a request for some moral justification, according to the norms and expectations of Hopi social convention, that make meaningful the terms of the will which have the illocutionary force of appointing him administrator. Even for Dan then, the party with most to gain by proving the testamentary validity of the will, the significance of that document cannot fully be accounted for by mere reference to the decedent's intentions, but must also be measured in light of Hopi social convention -the very stuff of Whiteley's second Hopi (meta)intentionality.
Here then the two Hopi intentionalities Whiteley (1998) describes both emerge in Dan's discourse, and they might be said to repose on each other. Indeed that is the very essence of Dan's point. Nellie's intentions regarding Dan are easily knowable as nothing more than the usual response to a son who has so dutifully attended to his mother, fulfilling that role as it has been intended to be played from the origins of Hopi social structure and practice.
It is when Jean proffers her challenges to the validity of the will that the distinctness of these calculi of Hopi meaning and interpretation are most starkly visible. At first Jean seems both willing and able to inquire into Nellie's intentions at the time the will was written. Because she is not represented by an attorney, she is allowed to cross-examine Dan directly on these issues. And the following interaction transpires It is in these turns, I would contend, that we can observe Jean proposing a challenge to Nellie's will that is informed by a calculus of meaning which includes the conventions and (perhaps) consequences of the act, but with less concern for the intentions behind the will. Here, as before, Jean justifies her opposition to the will along lines readily recognizable as legitimate claims in light of Hopi conventions of traditional clan home inheritance, and the larger Hopi socio-ideological order which informs it and which it perpetuates. Jean claims, at ll. 005-011 that it is as the clanswoman responsible for all the ceremonial duties attached to the home in question ('I'm the one that's watching the Mudheads . . . I'm the one that's doing everything over there'), that the home should go to her -just as ceremonial homes have always gone to women who show an initiative for bearing the responsibilities of ritual participation. Moreover, Jean seems to argue that whatever the outcome, the home should certainly not go to Dan. For it is by virtue of the sexual division of ceremonial labor (ll. 012-013 ' And that's not a man's job . . .), and the division of certain ritual prerogatives among the different clans (l. 014 'and also he's from a different clan'), that Dan is unfit according to Hopi traditions to perform the duties of the house. Implied in this is perhaps something of a veiled threat. Hopi listeners, particularly family and village members of which a few were present in the courtroom audience, may be inclined to contemplate what would happen if Dan were given the home. How would those responsibilities be carried out? Or would they at all? If not, and in light of the ideologies of letter-perfect attention to detail in Pueblo ritual performance (Kroskrity, 1993; Ortiz, 1972; Whiteley, 1998) , would this ceremony have to cease? Would one of the last remaining clan homes in their village lose its significance? Although we cannot unambiguously show it here, all of these consequences may well have been implied by Jean in this statement, particularly in light of Hopi penchants for eschatological reasoning and commentary (Geertz, 1994; Whiteley, 1998) .
Thus it is for all these reasons, Jean explains, that she 'deserves things too', and one 'thing' in particular that she was not promised by the terms of Nellie's will. But there is here no reference to the intentions that may have been behind the will. Nor can we read Jean's statements regarding these conventions and consequences as attempting, as described earlier, to show that Nellie could not have intended to give the home to Dan. Here then we do not see the two Hopi intenRichland: The multiple calculi of meaning 91 tionalisms reposing on each other. Jean's argument against the validity of the will is grounded in a theory of meaning entirely distinct from the theory implied in Dan's, the judge's, and even Jean's own statements regarding the intentions informing the purported will. This theory may even be made in opposition to the former theory, insofar as Jean could be claiming a significance for the will irregardless of its value as an accurate expression of Nellie's intent. Thus in this context, Whiteley's intentionalisms -that of the individual, and that of the evermanifesting, 'agential' social order -are revealed as two separate and distinct theories for interpreting actions and events.
Conclusion
My goal in this article has largely involved developing analyses that were made possible by the work of linguistic anthropologists who hinted at the likelihood of multiple meaning-making practices in the speech communities they studied, but who did not engage in any extended treatment and research into such multiplicities. To this end, I have taken insights from Austin's models of speech act theory, particularly those regarding the fundamental indeterminacy that might characterize the location of sources of meaning, and coupled them with recognition from legal anthropologists that contexts of dispute and conflict provide a unique site for revealing competing cultural norms and practices, to both suggest and display how analysis of dispute interactions provide a good opportunity to reveal the multiple, distinct, and sometimes competing theories of meaning that are available to members of a single speech community. Where such multiplicity is often elided by the smooth flow of everyday interaction, it is in moments of conflict and contestation, and the degree to which such conflicts emerge around the indeterminate significance of an action or event, that very different and even competing calculations of meaning can be worked up by interactants for strategic rhetorical advantage in the heat of dispute resolution discourses.
We have thus seen in Hopi courtroom interactions that discourses of Hopi tradition and Anglo-American law become the loci for an array of interpretive practices undertaken by parties to these adversarial proceedings. Thus examples were provided that revealed how notions of Hopi tradition straddle the two forms of intentionality that ground Hopi metaphysics and hence afford arguments that constitute a significance for disputed events either in light of social convention, or the specific intentions of esteemed elders, and often both. Then, to suggest how these get invoked for strategic purposes, an effort was made to explore how these practices get worked up over the course of a single property dispute. That analysis suggested at least three different meaning-making calculations being constituted by participants. The first was that of the judge, who worked to impose an interpretive frame on the dispute interaction that derives from AngloAmerican notions concerning the significance of a will as a document expressing testamentary intent, and the ways in which such intent can be ascertained. The second was exemplified in Dan's reasoning (but also employed by Jean), where 92 Discourse & Society 17(1) the conventions of a good Hopi son's treatment of his mother is going to impel certain intentions in that woman to provide for him in her will. The third and final calculation, Jean's, took no measure of intention but rather considered the significance of the will solely in the light of conventions of Hopi ceremonial and clan structure and practices, and the consequences to these orders should the terms of the purported will be followed. Insofar as in such conflict talk Hopi disputants are all oriented toward furthering their own interests through a presentation of their perspective on the disputed action, and insofar as Hopi judges are charged with having to decide in favor of one party or the other, it seems that the talk in such contexts becomes a uniquely suitable locus for investigating all the different and even incompatible ways single events and actions can be made meaningful -incompatibilities that in other, more overtly cooperative contexts of interaction, are necessarily overlooked and ignored.
To make my own intentions at least a little less ambiguous, it is my hope that through this analysis new insights are provided into how the multiplicity that operates in so many aspects of social life is given a proper consideration in the details of meaning-making practice, an object of inquiry that has become a cornerstone of linguistic anthropological endeavor over the last 30 years. And insofar as an article about the multiplicity and complexity of communicative acts and events should approach some understanding about the multiplicity of meanings to which it may be susceptible, it is also hoped that this article shall stand at the heart of anthropological debates and disputes which it will, in the best of circumstances, spark in the future.
9. Transcription conventions are as follows: Speakers are identified by their first name or title in the far left column. Note also the following conventions using a modified system developed by Jefferson and described in Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974) 
